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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
CONSOLIDATED FINANCE
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

l

KENT MOULTON, dba SOUTH
~
DAVIS CAMPER SALES, and
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE
COMPANY, a foreign corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12266

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff against
the defendant Kent Moulton, a licensed used motor
vehicle dealer, and the defendant Mid-Century Insurance Company, his bonding company, to recover
the balance allegedly due on the sale of a used trailer. The action against the bonding company is
brought under Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which provides in part that applicants for
a dealer's license shall conduct their business without fraud or fraudulent representation, and Section
41-3-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which provides
that any person who suffers loss because of fraud or
1
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fraudulent representation on the part of a licensed
dealer may recover from the dealer's surety.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a full hearing on the merits, the trial court
granted defendants' Motions To Dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint upon the ground that the debt of
the defendant Kent Moulton had been discharged in
bankruptcy subsequent to the sale of the trailer and
that the plaintiff had failed to show that defendant
Kent Moulton was guilty of any fraud or fraudulent
representation which was the cause of any loss sustained by the plaintiff which would support a judgment against the bonding company.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Mid-Century Insurance Company
seeks an affirmance of the trial court's granting of
its Motion To Dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Mid-Century Insurance Company
agrees with only part of the facts as presented by
the appellant, and believes that some of the facts
stated in Appellant's Brief are not facts but are mere
conclusions or opinions. We, therefore, feel it proper
to review the evidence upon which the trial court
based its decision.
In March of 1967 Clyde Allen, an officer of
Consolidated Finance Corporation, asked Kent Moulton to go to Pioche, Nevada and to pick up a repossessed trailer (R. 40, 41, 69). Moulton was then doing
2
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business as South Davis Camper Sales Company, but
has since declared bankruptcy. After retrieving the
trailer Moulton suggested that since he was in the
business of selling trailers the trailer should be left
on his lot for sale, and Allen agreed ( R. 69, 70).
Sometime in May, 1967 the defendant Kent
Moulton contacted Mr. Allen, whereupon the followmg occurred :
"Q.

Sometime toward in May he came down,
or around the first part of May he came
down and said he had a sale for the trailer, is that correct?
A. Well, I would think that he probably called me on it at that time. I called him intermittentlv concerning the trailer.
Q. Well then at one time, whether he called
you by phone or otherwise, he did tell you
he could sell the trailer?
A. Right.
Q. And he needed the title to the vehicle?
A. This is correct.
Q. And you had the title then in your possession?
A. Right.
Q. So he came out to Tooele, as I understand
it, and picked up the title?
A. This is memory on how it transacted. I
was reminded that possibly my brother
might have taken it up to him on a trip
up there, but I don't recall it.
Q. At any rate, at the time you surrendered
3
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

the title to him he didn't pay you in money
or give you the $4,700.00 check?
This is right.
And so at that time you were simply trusting him with the title to the vehicle on his
representation that he had a sale for it?
This is correct.
And you don't know whether you took the
title to him or your brother took the title?
I am sure I didn't go up with it. I don't
remember exactly how he got it. As I recall he said he needed it in a hurry and he
was going up to Ogden to consummate the
deal, and I just don't remember. I am
sure I would have done it the fastest way
possible.
Now, the balance shown on your contract
with Mr. B 1 ant on was $5,963.00, or
around that sum, and the amount we have
been talking about is $4, 700.00. Did you
agree you would let him have the trailer
for $4,700.00?
The agreement was he could sell it for
whatever he wanted.
THE COURT: For whatever he wanted,
or could he get?
THE \VITNESS: For whatever he could
get, but the price that he arrived at was
to take care of his trip down to pick the
traile1· up and net me $4,700.00.
(By l\fr. Hanson) So f r:om the sale of t~e
vehicle he was to take his expenses for his
trip down to get the trailer and then pay
you $4,700.00?
4
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Right.
Now, at the time you surrendered the title
to him he could have sold the trailer and
not paid you anything, is that correct?
Well, this is correct.
I mean, he at that point hail the power to
dispose of the trailer as he saw fit, and
you had no security left, is that correct?
This would have been true.
In effect, what you were doing was trusting him to pay you $4,700.00?
Well, it works out to that. I mean, I didn't
have any other choice maybe.
You were anxious to get rid of this trailer?
I was very anxious to close the account
and get the money, right.
So at the time you received the check of
$4,700.00 through the mail on May 26th
the man already owed you $4,700.00?
This is true.
You did not part with the title of this vehicle on any theory or any idea that the
check was either bad or good, did you?
Say that again?
·vvell let's put it this way. You had already surrendered the title when you received the check?
This is right.
So whether the check was good or bad you
didn't part with any consideration or any5
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thing at the time you received the $4,700.00 checks?
A. I had already parted with the consideration, this is right.
Q. You had already turned the title over to
him?
A. Already given him the title, right." (R.
70, 71, 72)
The defendant Kent Moulton was successful in
negotiating a sale of the trailer for $5,000.00, although there appears to be some question as to just
when that sale took place. He testified that the sale
of the trailer took place in March of 1967, but further testified that the sale did not take place until
after the discussion in May with Mr. Allen, at which
time Mr. Allen had stated he wanted $4, 700.00 for
the trailer ( R. 83). He further testified that Clyde
Allen's brother brought him the title along with the
other warranty papers at least a month before he
sold the trailer ( R. 83, 84). Moreover, he testified
that the trailer sat in his yard prior to his selling it
for two to three months (R. 41, 80), which would
make the sale sometime in ]tiay or June of 1967.
On May 26, 1967 at Moulton's office in Bountiful, Utah Kent Moulton delivered to Clyde Allen a
check for $4,700.00 (Ex. 2-P, R. 80,81). Kent Moulton testified that "I told Clyde the check wasn't any
good and he said he needed it to close his books to satisfy his people, and I would make it good as soon as
I could" (R. 81). That check was returned unpaid,
6
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and on June 26, 1967 defendant Kent Moulton forwarded a second check to Mr. Allen ( R. 65,81). Again
Mr. Moulton testified that Mr. Allen stated he was
closing his books and needed something to close his
books. This check was also returned unpaid (Ex. 6-P,
R. 65). Thereafter Mr. Moulton continued to make
payments on the account down to a balance of $2,206.60 (R. 68).
In his business as a camper dealer the defendant
Moulton maintained a "floor planning" arrangement
with South Davis Security Bank, which in May of
1967 fluctuated between $17,000 and $24,000. He
also had a checking account with the same Bank
which was maintained separately from the floor planning arrangement (R. 50). When items which were
floor planned were sold the money would be put into
the checking account and then would be transferred
to pay off loans due under the floor planning arrangement, so that both separate accounts were used
in financing the operation of defendant Moulton (R.
49, 50). The Bank would, on occasion, have to 1\"'ait
for one check to clear before another one could clear,
and the waiting period was usually limited to three
or four days before checks would be returned for insufficient funds (R. 54, 56). The checking account
i·efe1Ted to is the same account on which the two
checks for $4,700.00 (Ex. 2-P and 6-P) were drawn.
On May 25, 1967 there was $5,608.18 in the
checking account; and on part of May 26, 1967 (the
day on which the first check for $4, 700.00 was
7
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drawn) th~re was $8,284.80 on deposit (Ex. 3-P, R.
48). However, when that check was presented for
pa:1"ment on June 6, 1967 (R. 54) there were not
sufficient funds in the Bank (Ex. 4-P) to pay the
check. ..:'\...gain, on June 26, 1967 (at the time the second $4,700.00 check was drawn) there was $5,067.11
in the checking account. But again when the check
was p1~esented for payment it was returned for insufficient funds.
Based on the foregoing evidence the Court in its
Memorandum Decision found:
"l. That it clearly appears to the Court
that the relationship between the plaintiff and
Defendant Moulton was one of a seller and
purchaser.

"2. That the Defend ant Moulton apparently made some effort to pay the agreed sale
price reducing the arnount thereof to approximately half of the agreed amount, the payments thereon bein; over some period of time.
"3. That the tLle w~s delivered to the Defendant Moulton, fr,~ plaintiff, of course,
knowing that with t11~ title of possession in
Moulton that a sale cov ld be made.
"4. That although th~ Defendant Moulton received the f•1ll :iale price there was no
clear and convinciP p evidence that there was
any intention upon the i·art of Moulton to defraud or cheat the plaintiff, which would be
contradicted by his payin~- half of the sale
price, and further ty his effiJrts and attempts
to pay the balance." (R. 30, 31)
8
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE "?' -~E.
SENTED UPON WHICH THE TRIAL co:-JRi
COULD FIND IN FAVOR OF THE BOND fNG
COMPANY AND AGAINST THE APPELL T

The plaintiff's main thrust in this action was
against the Bonding Company. While the theory of
this case against the defendant Kent Moulton is not
made clear either from the trial of the action or its
Brief filed herein, we suppose the plaintiff relied on
the same claim of fraud to overcome the effect of the
defendant Moulton's subsequent discharge in bankruptcy as it did in asserting a claim against the bonding company, Mid-Century Insurance Company.
The sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, on which it apparently relied read in part
as follows:
"41-;)-1 fi ... Before any new motor vehicle dAaler's licern;e or used motor vehicle dealer's lictnse shall bP- issued by the administrator to any applicant therefor the said applicant
shall procure ancl file with the administrator
a good !lnd sufficient bond in the amount of
$5,000.00 with corporate surety thereon, ...
and ronditionAd that said applicant shall con··
duct his business as a dealer without fraud or
fraudulent representation, and without the violation of any of the provisions of this act."
"41-3-18 ... If any person shall suffer
any loss or damage by reason of fraud, fraudulent representation or viola~ion of any of the
provisions of this act by a licensed dealer or
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

one of his salesmen, ... such person shall have
a right of action against such dealer, and/or
~lie automobile salesman guilty of the fraud
fraudulent _r~presenta~ion or violation of any
of the prov1s1ons of this act, and,/ or the sure~: es upon their respective bonds."
It should be emphasized at the outset thatthe only
qu(;stion on appeal is whether there was evidence presented upon which the trial court could find in favor
cf the bonding company and against the appellant.
The question is not whether any member of this Court,
sitting as a trier of fact in this case, would have
reached the same conclusion the trial court reached,
(mt whether there is any competent evidence to suplJOrt the conclusion arrived at by that court. This
Court has stated on numerous occasions that findings of fact made by the trial court will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Therefore, the findingp. of the lower court
must be affirmed unless thc~'e -was not reasonablµ
basis in the evidence on which the court could fairly
and rationally have thought the requisite proof was
met. Lowe vs. Rosenlof, 12 l_Ttah 2d 190, 364 P. 2d
418 ( 1961) ; Child vs. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P. 2d
981 (1958).
The foregoing standarrl. for appellate review
\\;_:s applied in the followjng f1·aud cases, where, as
ir.. the present case, the trial judge was required to
make a finding of fact: Lock ~'8. i_,ock, 8 Ariz. App.
l~>S3, 444 P. 2d 163 (1968); Cullison'l!s. Pride O'Texas
CJrns Associotion, 88 Ariz. 257, 355 P. 2d 898
10
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( 1960); Wright vs. Rogers, 172 Cal 2d 349, 342 P.
2d 447, 455 (1959); Nalbandia10 '!JS. By;·oit. Jackson
Pmnps, Inc,, 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P. 2d 681, S86 (1965);
Prudential Insurance Company vs. Anaya, 78 N.M.
101, 428 P. 2d 640, 643 ( 1967).
On page 7 of its Brief the appellant asserts that
it is undisputed and admitted by the defendant Moulton that he sold the trailer and collected $5,000.00 on
the sale price in March of 1967 and that he failed to
disclose this fact to the plaintiff's agent until some
two months later when he gave them a check for $4,700.00. This claim is refuted by the testimony of the
plaintiff's witness, Clyde J. Allen, who testified that
he sent Mr. Moulton out in March to get the repossessed trailer (R.69) and that the trailer was in defendant Moulton's possession for prob ab 1y two
months before he had a sale for it (R. 41). Mr. Allen
further testified that v1hen the defendant Moulton
called him in May relative to getting title to the vehicle, and prior to the time the $4, 700.00 check was
given, he informed Mr. Allen that he had a sale for
the trailer (R. 70) but that at that time nothing was
said about how much Kent Moulton was selling the
trailer for, only that the plaintiff wanted a net of $4,700.00 for the trailer (R. 70, 71, 72). Although Kent
Moulton did testify at one point that he sold the trailer in March of 1967 ( R. 82), he further testified that
he had the trailer in his possession for two to three
months prior to selling it (R. 80). He denied that
he got $5,000.00 for the trailer in March and never
11
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paid the plaintiff until May ( R. 82). He further
testified that he had the title to the trailer (which he
received from Mr. Allen) at least a month before the
sale (R. 83) and that he did not conclude the sale until after the discussion with Mr. Allen in which Mr.
Allen said the finance company wanted $4,700.00
(R. 84, 85).
The assertion is further made that defendant
Moulton delivered a check on May 26, 1967, or shortly thereafter, bearing the date of May 26, 1967, at
a time when he did not have money available in the
bank to pay the check. The record is that for at least
a part of the day of May 26, 1967 Moulton had a balance of $8,284.80 ( R. 48). The record further indicates that in May of 1967, in addition to the checking
account, defendant Moulton had a financing arrangement with the Bank upon which the check was drawn
by which he had been extended credit fluctuating between $17,000 and $24,000 in May of 1967 (R. 49).
The appellant further makes the assertion on
page 8 of its Brief that the defendant Moulton was
guilty of embezzlement as defined by 76-17-5, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, which states:
"Every person intrusted with any property as bailee, tenant or lodger, or with any
power of attorney for the sale or transfer
thereof, who fraudulently converts the same,
or the proceeds thereof, to his own use, or secretes it with a fraudulent intent to convert it
to his own use, is guilty of embezzlement."
12
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The fallacy with this argument is that it misconstrues the arrangement between the plaintiff and
the defendant Moulton. According to the plaintiff's
witness, Clyde Allen, the defendant Moulton at the
time he got the title to the trailer told him that he had
a sale for the trailer. Nothing was said, according to
Mr. Allen, about the amount of the sale. The only
thing that was said was that the plaintiff had to realize $4,700.00 on the trailer. Upon the assumption
that the defendant Moulton was willing to pay the
plaintiff $4, 700.00 for the trailer, Mr. Allen parted
with the title to the trailer. Defendant Moulton was
at that point free to sell the trailer for whatever sum
he could realize out of the trailer, be that $5,000.00
or some other figure. The purport of that agreement,
as found by the trial court, was that the plaintiff
agreed to sell the trailer to Kent Moulton for the sum
of $4, 700.00 and that Moulton was thereafter free to
resell the trailer for any figure that he might choose.
The evidence further indicates, as found by the court,
that the title was delivered to the defendant Moulton,
the plaintiff knowing that with the title of possession
in Moulton a sale could be made.
It has been universally held that
" ... when dealings between two persons
create a relation of debtor and creditor, a failure of one of the parties to pay over money
does not constitute the crime of embezzlement." 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Embezzlement, Section
17, at page 567.
State vs. Clayton, 80 Utah 557, 15 P. 2d 1057 ( 1932);
13
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Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea C01npany, 5 Utah 2d
187, 299 P. 2d 622, 625 (1956); Kelly vs. People, 402
P. 2d 934, 936 ( 1965).

In the Clayton case a woman by the name of
Smith transacted all of her business pertaining to a
certain parcel of real estate for a period of four or
five years with a certain real estate company on an
open or running account, with credits being made for
moneys received and debits being made for moneys
paid out. The defendants, who were officers of the
company during the course of these transactions, had
received moneys which were to be applied to the payment of an outstanding mortgage. The company became insolvent and ceased to do business. The defendants were accused of embezzlement on the theory
that they had used the money which should have been
applied on the mortgage for other corporate purposes
and that they had fraudulently converted moneys belonging to another. In reversing the lower court convictions, this Court pointed out that
" ... the dealings had by Mrs. Smith with
the real estate company created but the relation of debtor and creditor and not one of trust
in the sense required to constitute an embezzlement or a breach thereof. And, since the monies held by the real estate company were not
acquired or held in virtue of such a trust rel.ation no offense of embezzlement was committed by a failure or neglect to pay the monies
over.
"So far as concerns the offense of embez14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

zlement or other crime, the situation is no different. because the company thereafter failed
m busmess and was unable to meet its obligation." 15 P. 2d at page 1062.
The same conclusions were reached in the case
of Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea Company, supra. In
that case the defendant was a salesman. It was the
practice for salemen to collect money on their routes,
from which they were permitted to deduct items of
expense (including the amount they had earned as
salary from the company) as shown by a voucher
(yellow sheet) which the company furnished them,
and remit the remainder to the company. They deposited the funds in their own bank accounts and remitted to the company by check. It was also shown
that on prior occasions the defendant had remitted
checks for different amounts than the exact figures
owing to the company and that the company had
made no objection to this procedure. The court said
that this created a debtor and creditor relationship,
and went on to say
"Under the relationship of debtor and
creditor, rather than agent and principal, in
which the agent is in possession of particular
funds belonging to the principal, embezzlement would not lie. The money in question
would not be 'the property of another' within
the meaning of our statute." 299 P. 2d ~t page
625, citing Utah Code Annotated, Sect10n 7617-7 ( 1953) .
Furthermore, the record is lacking in evidence
that the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff.
15
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He did not fail to disclose to the plaintiff that he had
a sale for the trailer, nor did he at any time deny that
he was indebted to the plaintiff for the $4, 700.00
which he had agreed to pay. There was conflicting
testimony as to whether Consolidated had ever made
arrangements with Moulton to pay off the balance
due in installments. Clyde Allen testified that there
were no arrangements for credit, but Kent Moulton
stated that he and Allen had talked about putting the
remainder on a contract but that nothing was ever
done about a contract (R. 43, 81). Nevertheless, the
defendant Moulton did pay and the plaintiff Consolidated did in fact accept $2,493.40 from Moulton in
installment payments on the account, and plaintiff
cannot in good faith assert otherwise.
The plaintiff's claim that the defendant Kent
Moulton perpetrated a fraud upon the plaintiff in
this case is reduced down to the fact that the defendant Moulton gave the plaintiff two checks for $4,700.00 which were returned for insufficient funds.
This evidence alone is insufficient to prove fraud
under the bonding statute.
The case of Phoenix Auto Auction vs. State
Automobile Insurance, 86 Ariz. 337, 346 P. 2d 146
( 1959) is directly in point. There a car dealer purchased an automobile at an auction and gave a $1,500.00 check for the purchase price, which check was
returned for insufficient funds. The dealer had purchased 25 or 30 cars before from the auction without
any problem. Evidence produced at the trial revealed
16
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that there were sufficient funds to cover the check
only on July 25, and the period from August 11 to
August 15. The Arizona statute under which the action was commenced is not worded the same as the
Utah statute in that an "unlawful act" rather than
a "fraudulent representation" is required in Arizona. But in evaluating the statute the Arizona court
made the same inquiry as that made by the trial court
in the present case,
"Whether there was an intent to defraud on
the part of (the dealer)." 346 P. 2d at 148.
The court held that the dealer did not intend to defraud the seller simply because he drew an insufficient funds check.
"Appellant contends that the act of ...
drawing the $1,500.00 check on July 14, not
only falls within the definition of 'unlawful
act' but is sufficient to constitute a criminal
violation of A.R.S. Section 13-316, 'drawing
defraud; etc.' It is asserted that the trial court
could correctly reach only one conclusion from
the facts as stated. We disagree. The trier of
fact must needs have decided as a factual question, 'was there an intent to defraud?'
"It is useless to summarize appellant's
arguments leading to the conclusion that such
an intent existed. The question is not whether
any member of this court, sitting as a trier of
fact in this case, would have reached the same
conclusion the trial court reached, but whether
there is any competent evidence to support the
conclusion arrived at by that court. We hold
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the record contains evidence to support the
implied finding of the trial court.
"The burden of proving an intent to defraud was on the appellant. The trial court
f rorn the evidence could reasonably conclude
that appellant had not carried that burden and
that (defendants) merely breached their contract with appellant, and that therefore (defendants) were liable for the sum of $1',500.00; but since there was nothing more than a
breach of contract, appellee surety was not liable under its bond." Id. at 148, 149.
Plaintiff and appellant cites the case of C01nmercial Insurance Conipany of Newark, New Jersey
vs. Watson, 261 F. 2d 143 (10 Cir.). An analysis of
the facts in that case as set out in the plaintiff's
Brief on page 10 will show that the course of conduct
complained of on the part of the dealer in that case
went far beyond simply writing a check for insufficient funds to pay an obligation which was admittedly owing. In that case the dealer, Powell, represented
to Import, a wholesale dealer in foreign automobiles,
that he had a sale for a Volkswagen and induced Import to give him possession of it and to deposit the
title papers in the Los Alamos branch of a Santa Fe
Bank with a sight draft for the purchase price in the
sum of $1,625.00. The title papers so deposited consisted of an assignment from the original nonresident owner by power of attorney to Import's Manager, and a reassignment of title by registered dealer
from Import to Powell's Downtown Auto Sales at
Santa Fe. When the sight draft was not paid, Powell
18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

instructed Import to draw another draft for the
amount of the purchase price, with title attached, on
another bank where he usually did business, and
through which he would "floor-plan" the car. Import
finally instructed the bank to release title to Powell
without payment of the draft, but to return the attached power of attorney. In a subsequent telephone
conversation, Import complained of nonreceipt of
payment and Powell professed not to understand why
payment had not been made by the bank, and said
that he would go to the bank and see what was up.
Several days later, Powell sold the automobile and
delivered the certificate of title and a bill of sale. The
purchaser of the automobile from Powell was unable
to secure transfer of the title because of the absence
of the power of attorney from the original owner.
Import then delivered the power of attorney to clear
the title and took an assignment of the purchaser's
claim against Powell.
As stated by the court in its opinion, Powell was
guilty of fraud in a number of respects,
in obtaining possession of the automobile and then title for the ostensible purpose
of 'floor-planning' the car at a bank, when considered in the light of his later professions not
to know why payment had not been made by
the bank though he had not negotiated the
agreed fi~ancing, certainly i~dicate a~ intent
to defraud his seller. Indeed, it was qmte sufficient to justify the court's finding of fraudulent conduct." 261 F. 2d at 445.
1
' ' •••
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Although it is not pointed out in the opinion, it
further appears that Powell sold the car to a purchaser even though at the time he was unable to deliver title to the automobile and that Import subsequently delivered the power of attorney to clear the
title and took an assignment of the purchaser's claim.
It is noteworthy that nothing is said in the entire
case about issuing a check against insufficient funds.
The Utah Bonding Statute was intended to assure against losses based on fraud, fraudulent misrepresentations or violation of the motor vehicle statutes. It was not, however, intended to guarantee that
an automobile dealer would pay his debts or simply
to protect the creditors of an automobile dealer. Despite appellant's insistence that the drawing of a
check on insufficient funds should constitute a per se
violation of the Bonding Statute, no authority for
such an assertion is cited, and such assertion is directly opposed to the laws of this state and other jurisdictions. The trial court's findings in this case are,
in our opinion, supported by the preponderance of
the evidence. At least, there is no evidence from
which it should be held that the trial judge was compelled to find otherwise.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PR 0 PERL Y FOUND
THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF
FRAUD

In the second point of its argument the plain·
20
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tiff and appellant makes the assertion that the trial
court misconceived the nature of the fraud required
to support a judgment for the plaintiff. Such an assertion proceeds on the premise that the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof that the defendant Moulton was guilty of fraud, however plaintiff and appellant may define that term, which the defendants
and respondents deny as pointed out in the argument
in the foregoing part of this Brief. Plaintiff and appellant then set out some general definitions of the
term ''fraud," with which we do not disagree.
Plaintiff cites the case of Lawrence vs. Ward,
5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P. 2d 619. In that case the fraudulent acts complained of, in the language of the court,
arose out of two transactions. In the first,
"Ward, being in financial difficulty, sold
a 1954 Cadillac and delivered title to the buyer.
He then represented himself to the agent of
the bank as the owner and mortgaged the car,
receiving a check for $2500, which was cashed
and collected. He was unable to pay the promissory note and the bank claims that its loss was
occasioned by the fraudulent representations
of a licensed dealer and should be recoverable
against his bond." 5 Utah 2d at 261.
The court agreed in this instance, and also in the second instance where
·"One Dalton purchased a 1954 Ch~vrolet
from United Auto Sales and executed his note
to the Sandy City Bank. A check! :payable to
Dalton and United Auto Sales JOmtly, was
sent to the company by the bank and later cash21
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ed and collected. vVhen the company was unable to deliver title, Dalton refused to pay on
the note because his endorsement on the ·check
was a forgery. The trial court gave judgment
for the bank against Ward and Selleneit since
they had received the proceeds of the check. A
forgery likewise falls within the protection of
the bond and it is immaterial that the bank
carried insurance against forgery." Id at 262.
As can be seen in these two cases, the fraudulent
or unlawful acts of the dealer consisted of representing himself to be the owner of an automobile which
he did not own and which he had already sold, and
in receiving the proceeds of a forged check. The facts
of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts
of the case at hand. Defendant Moulton in this case
made no misrepresentations to the plaintiff. He simply obtained title to the trailer by promising to pay
the sum of $4,700.00 to the plaintiff. The evidence
indicates that at the time he clearly intended to live
up to that promise. In the course of attempting to live
up to that promise he did give the plaintiff checks
which proved to be drawn against insufficient funds.
These checks, it should be noted, were not given at
the time title was turned over to the defendant Moulton. As indicated by the appellant's own witness, the
plaintiff simply trusted the defendant Moulton to
pay the $4,700.00.
The court did define the plaintiff's burden of
proof in the Lmcrence case, supra, saying on page
261 of the Utah Reports
22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

" ... plaintiff must prove a material, false
representation, an intention that the representation should be acted on in the manner contemplated; the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement, his reliance upon it, his
right to rely and his proximate injury ... "
Plaintiff cites the Arizona case of Comme1-c:ial
Standard Insurance Co. vs. West, 74 Ariz. 359, 249
P. 2d 830. This case was cited in the case of Lawrence
vs Ward in support of the court's holding in Lawrence vs. Ward that the mortgagee who recovered
judgment against a dealer for fraud was also entitled
to judgment against the bonding company. The facts
indicate that the plaintiff, a licensed dealer, sold two
cars to buyers who signed Conditional Sales Contracts as ''purchasers." The plain tiff did not sign as
the "seller," although he was the true owner. The
plaintiff delivered the Sales Contracts to the defendant, also a licensed dealer, who signed them as "seller." The defendant then assigned the contracts to a
bank and collected the proceeds, which he converted.
The trial court found that the defendant had violated
the provisions of the Arizona bonding statute in that
he had engaged in an "unlawful act" by converting
the money. The trial court, sitting without a jury,
found that the defendant had fraudulently converted
the plaintiff's money, and the bonding company appealed.
The defendant's "unlawful act" was not questioned on appeal, and the only issue was whether the
defendant was acting as a "dealer" as required by
23
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the statute. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's findings, pointing out that the statute was broad enough to cover all unlawfull activities
engaged in by a licensed dealer. Although the court
did not go into detail as to how the defendant had converted the money, it appears that his fraudulent conduct was more or less unquestioned. Apparently there
was no evidence that the defendant attempted to pay
back any of the money or that he exercised any good
faith in the transaction.
Likewise the case cited by the plaintiff of State
ex rel MacNaughton vs. New A1nsterdam Cas. Co.,
1 Wis. 2d 494, 85 N.W. 2d 337 is not in point. In that
case, as pointed out by the plaintiff's Brief, a customer of a used car lot left his automobile to be sold.
The dealer, without his knowledge or consent, mortgaged the car to a finance company and subsequently
sold the car after a bond covering the operation expired. There appeared to be no contest that the action
of the dealer in mortgaging the car which he did not
own was fraudulent. The defense proceeded on the
ground that the innocent purchaser of the automobile
did not sustain a loss until the sale of the automobile,
which was after the bond of the dealer had expired.
By relying on cases in which the trial court's
findings of fraud were affirmed, the appellant reveals its failure to properly characterize the issue on
appeal. Indeed, the appellant has overlooked numerous cases, including the Phoenix Auto Auction case,
supra, wh'ich are directly in point and which may be
24
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relied upon as holding directly against its position
in the present appeal. In Butte Motor Company vs.
Strand, 225 Ore. 317, 358 P. 2d 279 ( 1960), the
plaintiff, a dealer engaged in the automobile business
in Butte, Montana, brought cars to be sold on the defendant's used car lot in Salem, Oregon. The defendant sold the cars and gave the plaintiff two checks,
both of wllich were returned for insufficient funds.
Moreover, the defendant never did pay for the cars
but used the proceeds for other purposes because he
was in financial difficulty. The Oregon bonding statute is worded so that the dealers are required to "conduct (their) business as a dealer without fraud or
fraudulent representation and without violating any
of the provisions of this chapter." 358 P. 2d at 280,
citing 0.R.S. Section 481.310. The plaintiff based his
claims solely on the theory that the defendant's conduct in failing to pay for the cars when they were
sold amounted to fraud as that term is used in the
statute.
The court expressly rejected this argument and
held the defendant not liable, pointing out that the
failure to perform a promise relating to future action
or conduct does not constitute fraud within the meaning of the bonding statute. The court also emphasized
that the promise to pay was not made in bad faith and
that the findings of the trial court could not be disturbed as long as they were "supported by substantial evidence." 358 P. 2d at 281.
In Warner Motor Company vs. Strand, 225 Ore.
25
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315, 358 P. 2d 282 ( 1960), a companion case to Butte,
supra, an owner delivered his car to the dealer for
sale. By agreement, the car was traded for four older
models which were sold, but the owner of the original
car received proceeds from only one of the four sales.
The court held that there was no fraud or violation
of the bonding statute on the grounds that the case
was controlled by the opinion in the Butte case, supra.
The case of Sterner vs. Lehnianowsky, 173 Neb.
401, 113 N.W. 2d 588 ( 1962) is also in point. In that
case two causes of action were brought by a small
loan company against a car dealer. In the first cause
of action the loan company gave the dealer a note,
mortgage and certificate of title to repossess a car
which had been purchased through the dealer. The
dealer collected the amount due on the mortgage but
did not remit it to the loan company. In the second
cause of action the dealer was accused of ( 1) failing
to return a repossessed car and ( 2) refusing to deliver insurance proceeds from a damaged vehicle. The
trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the
bonding company, and the plaintiff appealed. The
Nebraska bonding statute provided that " . . . the
licensed dealer will fully indemnify any person by
reason of any loss suffered because of ... ( e) any
false and fraudulent representations or deceitful
practices whatever in representing any motor vehicle ... " 113 N.W. 2d 592, citing Section 60-619,
R.R.S. ( 1943).
The court held that the plaintiff's evidence fail26
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ed to show willful fraud as required by the bonding
statute:
agree the bond does protect against
willful fraud, but willful fraud is not proved
by the mere failure to keep a promise or to pay
a debt ... We do not believe Lehmanowsky's
failure to keep his promise to turn over the
proceeds is a misappropriation within the
terms of the bond in this record." Id. at 595.
In the present appeal the defendant Kent Moulton purchased a vehicle from Consolidated Finance
Company for $4, 700.00, which was later sold for $5,000.00. Because he was in financial difficulty, defendant Moulton was not able to pay the $4,700.00 in
a lump sum, but he later, however, attempted to pay
back the amount owed and did, in fact, remit $2,493.40. In light of this evidence the trial court properly found that defendant Moulton did not intend to
defraud Consolidated Finance Company, even though
checks which he issued were returned for insufficient
funds. The trial court found that because defendant
Moulton attempted to pay for the trailer in subsequent installments Consolidated had failed in its attempt to produce clear and convincing evidence of
fraud. The trial court's findings are substantiated by
competent evidence from the record, and it is respectfully submitted that these findings should be affirmed.
~'We
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CONCLUSION
The trial court in this case found that the defendant Moulton in effect purchased a trailer from the
plaintiff, Consolidated Finance Company, for the
sum of $4, 700.00, and upon his promise to pay said
sum secured title to the trailer which he then sold to
another purchaser. He thereafter paid the plaintiff
some $2,493.40 of the agreed purchase price, leaving
a balance owing to the plaintiff of $2,206.60. During
the course of paying said obligation the defendant
Moulton gave the plaintiff two checks in the amount
of $4,700.00 which were not honored because of insufficient funds, although the evidence indicates that
at least at some time there were sufficient funds in
the bank upon which they were drawn to pay said
checks had they been presented at that time. At the
time the title to the trailer was delivered to the defendant Moulton, the plaintiff knew that defendant
Moulton needed the title so that he could resell the
trailer, which he subsequently did. In others words,
he in no way misrepresentated his intentions. The
plaintiff claims that the trial court's findings were
not supported by the evidence or that they in and of
themselves constitute evidence of fraud sufficient to
entitle it to a judgment against the defendant Kent
Moulton, who has subsequently taken out bankruptcy,
and his bonding company. It is submitted that the
court's findings were supported by sufficient competent evidence and that the plaintiff failed in its burden to show fraud on the part of the defendant Kent
28
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Moulton upon which a judgment against the defendants and respondents in this case can be based. It is
respectfully submitted, therefore, that the decision
of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DON J. HANSON of
HANSON & GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent MidCentury Insurance Co.
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